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Abstract: The article analyses the judicial reasoning 
employed by the religious courts in giving decisions on 
inheritance, particularly since the promulgation of the 1991 
Compilation of Islamic Law. It seeks to examine whether 
these courts use Islamic legal reasoning. This paper argues 
that the structure of the courts’ decisions is to be found in 
most Civil Law courts. It then offers three different 
approaches of reasoning employed by the religious courts 
in their decisions on inheritance: the use of the legislations 
particularly the Compilation as the sole source of deductive 
reasoning, the combination of the legislations and the 
Islamic sources which share the same implication, and the 
application of Islamic legal reasoning with the emphasis on 
the objectives of Islamic law (maqāsid al-sharī‘a) which does 
not contradict the legislations. Although Islamic legal 
reasoning is employed, in most cases the decisions are 
simple and straightforward.  
Keywords: the Religious courts, the compilation of Islamic 
law, inheritance, Islamic legal reasoning. 
Introduction 
Modernity has brought serious challenges to Islamic legal system. 
The establishment of the modern state together with the colonialism 
has led to ‘a systematic demolition of legal authority’ in Islam.2 In 
                                                                
1 An earlier version of this article was presented at the Annual International 
Conference of Islamic Studies (AICIS) XIII in Mataram West Nusa Tenggara in 
November 2013. The author thanks the conference participants for their helpful 
comments. 
2 Wael B. Hallaq, “Juristic Authority vs State Power: The Legal Crises of Modern 
Islam,” Journal of Law and Religion, vol. 19 (2003-2004): p. 244. 
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contrast with the practice of the pre-modern Islam, now it is the state 
which produces the legal authority for Muslim people. As the state 
takes over the control of legal doctrines, the ‘ulamā’ or fuqahā’ (Muslim 
jurists) no longer enjoy their traditional status as the authoritative legal 
interpreters. Their privilege has been undermined by the state through 
the employment of professional lawyers who are educated in secular 
laws.3 South-East Asian states faced the similar challenges.4 The idea of 
modern nation-state is something new. It is largely based on the 
principle of secularism in which applicable law is a matter of the state 
determination and is manifested in the state’s institutions. Nowadays, 
one finds Islamic law in state-defined forms in South-East Asia. The 
sovereignty of law comes from, instead of God’s revelation through 
Muslim jurists, the state itself.  
The significant transformation made by the modern state is likely 
to be apparent in the practices of courts. As a consequence of modern 
theories of nation-state, the courts are assumed to be the state 
institutions in which governmental powers and functions is vested. 
The legitimacy of modern Islamic courts is also derived from this 
doctrine.  Accordingly, they articulate their function by applying the 
law on the basis of rules of law formulated by the state power.  
In Indonesia, the existence of Islamic courts has been established 
by state legislations. During the Dutch colonial period, Islamic courts 
were regulated by Staatsblad No 152/1882 and Staatblad No 116 and 
610 of 1937. In the post-revolutionary era, the government first 
promulgated the regulation No 45/1957. The Law on judicial power of 
1970 and the Marriage Law of 1974 granted them more legitimacy. 
Then, with the enactment of the Law on Religious Justice in 1989, as 
amended by Law No 3/2006 and later by Law No 50/2009, their 
jurisdiction was widened. In addition, their power to execute the 
decisions has been recognized. The fact is that since 1980s there have 
been improvements in this judicial institution particularly in terms of 
the qualifications of judges and procedural matters. The judges as 
required by Law of Religious Judiciary must have a university degree 
either in syari’ah or general law. In addition, the law also sets condition 
for the graduate with general law degree that he or she should master 
                                                                
3 Ibid.; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Islam and the State,” Cardozo Law Review, vol. 12 (1990-
1991): p. 1015. 
4 See, e.g., M. B. Hooker, Islamic Law in South-East Asia (Kuala Lumpur: Harvard 
University Press, 1984), p. 36. 
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Islamic law. Interestingly, regardless the required knowledge in Islamic 
law (here also includes classical Islamic family law), in deciding cases, 
they are provided with “Islamic codifications” such as Marriage Law 
and the Compilation of Islamic Law.  
The reliance of the religious courts on those Islamic codifications, 
however, raises a question of whether this reliance could be read as an 
application of Islamic law in the traditional sense of the term. The fact 
that the Compilation, for instance, is based on, and derived from, 
authoritative literatures in Islamic law might indicate that it is an 
authentic expression of Indonesian version of Islamic family law. 
Nevertheless, this is likely to contradict the very nature of Islamic law 
(fiqh) as distinct from state law. While state law is defined by the 
government’s arms, Islamic law is basically jurists’ interpretations of 
the Islamic sources of law. Moreover, the religious courts’ judges are 
government employees. They are bound by the government’s ideology 
and policies. In this sense, they are required to decide cases in 
accordance with the principles and rules the state has laid down for 
them. It might be argued that the law on which the judges base their 
decisions is actually state-defined law. 
This paper deals particularly with judicial reasoning applied in the 
religious courts of Indonesia. It seeks to examine whether these courts 
use Islamic legal reasoning, especially in inheritance cases. It argues 
that the religious courts’ judges have to apply state laws using judicial 
methods which are common for other Indonesian courts. It becomes 
their enduring task to negotiate the state laws with Islamic legal 
reasoning. 
Islamic Courts and the Problem of Legal Reasoning 
In theory, there are two legal institutions which have functions of 
applying Islamic legal reasoning and articulating Islamic legal norms in 
a given case, namely fatwā and qad}ā’. These institutions have played a 
vital, robust role in maintaining the legitimacy of legal system facing 
with daily problems. Fatwā is an opinion on a point of religious law 
given by an authoritative figure or group in Muslim community. It is 
basically not binding in the sense that the questioner (mustaftī) could 
avoid the opinion and seek another view that pleased him or her. 
Qad}ā’, on the other hand, refers to an act of deciding dispute cases in 
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accordance with God’s law (h}ukm shar‘ī), by which judges’ decisions are 
binding to all parties.5  
The religious nature of an Islamic court is embodied in the notion 
of application of divine law. Muslim writers said that the exercise of 
the court is a vital principle of religion, one of the noble acts of 
devotion, one of the important religious duties and a communal 
obligation in Islam (fard} al-kifāyah). Judges are required to have such 
qualification as piety and knowledgeable of Islamic legal system and 
reasoning. They are obliged to decide cases in accordance with the 
rules of Islamic law. Does this mean that judges have to exercise legal 
reasoning accepted in Islamic legal methodology in deciding cases 
before them? 
The term legal reasoning here refers to, as John Makdisi called, 
“rationality in a legal system”.6 It means a coherent set of legal 
principles and established methods which are exploited in order to 
modify, determine and reconstruct the laws within a legal system. In 
Islamic legal system, legal reasoning is generally used to refer to ijtihād. 
It means the total endeavor made by a jurist to formulate rules of 
Islamic law. It is the third main source of Islamic law after al-Qur’an 
and Sunna. It manifests in various sources such as consensus (ijmā‘), 
analogy (qiyās), juristic preference (istih}sān) and public interests 
(mas }lah}ah). The significance of this concept lies in its role in mediating 
revelation and reason in the body of Islamic law.7  
The concept of ijtihād is in contrast with taqlīd. The term taqlīd 
means a submission to the authority or doctrines of a legal school. In 
this sense, the second category of mujtahid, namely mujtahid fī al-mażhab 
                                                                
5 The difference between what is called a rule of law according to judiciary and to 
religion, according to Musht }afā Aḥmad al-Zarqā’, al-Madkhal al-Fiqh al-‘Āmm 
(Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1998), vol. 1, pp. 67-69, constitutes the salient feature of 
Islamic law. See also Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Shari’ah Law: an Introduction (Oxford: 
Oneworld Publications, 2008), pp. 174-175.  
6 John Makdisi, “Formal Rationality in Islamic Law and the Common Law,” Cleveland 
State Law Review, vol. 34 (1985-1986): p. 97.  
7 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, revised ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Islamic Text Society, 1991), p. 366. See also Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī ibn 
Muḥammad al-Shaukānī, Irshād al-Fuḥūl ilā Taḥqīq al-Ḥaqq min ‘Ilm al-Uṣûl (Beirut: Dār 
al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1999), vol 2, pp. 205-206; Bernard Weiss, “Interpretation in 
Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihād,” The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 26, 
no. 2 (1990-1991): p. 200. 
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(a person who exercises ijtihād but is still bound by the school’s 
principles or just acknowledges the imam’s authority) is also regarded 
as pursuing taqlīd. In a common usage, it relates to non-‘ulamā’ or 
laymen who according to this concept are dependent for their 
knowledge of Islamic law on ‘ulamā or mujtahid.8 
Islamic legal theory requires that muftis should be mujtahids. The 
authority of legal interpretation and reasoning is basically attached to 
them. Are judges also required to be mujtahids, so they must exercise 
their own reasoning? According to the classical doctrines of Shafi‘ī, 
H {anbalī and some H {anafī, it was necessary for judges to be qualified as 
mujtahids. The majority of H {anafī, however, considered that non-
mujtahids were allowed to be appointed as judges. The qualification of 
ijtihād was not deemed necessary. It then became apparent in the 
course of history that the qualification of ijtihād was only a matter of 
ideal. In practice, the medieval legal scholars unwillingly accepted the 
appointment of non-mujtahids.9 
In fact, before the period of the establishment of legal schools, as 
Hallaq pointed out, there were many judges who are mujtahids. They 
accordingly exercised their own reasoning for the judgments. 
Whenever they faced difficult cases, they would consult more 
competent mujtahids. Shafi‘ī (d. 204/820) even encouraged judges to 
look for legal advice from muftī-mujtahids authority. Thus, it is likely that 
the legal authority of judges at that time was dependent upon their 
competence on Islamic legal reasoning (ijtihād). But, unlike judges, 
muftis were always mujtahids. Accordingly, they must be the authoritative 
figures to whom judges should seek the legal counsel. Islamic legal 
history shows that judges had largely consulted muftis’ works in dealing 
with cases before the courts or they regularly asked muftis for legal 
advice. This practice is apparent in the fatwa literatures. Most 
documentations of fatwa are suggested to stem from questions asked 
by judges to muftis regarding the cases before them.10  
                                                                
8 See, eg, Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Shaukānī, Irshād al-Fuḥūl, p. 239; 
Wael B. Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?,” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, vol. 16, no. 1 (1984): pp. 3-41. 
9 See, eg, Abū al-H}asan al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah wa al-Wilāyāt al-Dīniyyah 
(Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1996), pp. 109-110; ‘Abd al-Karīm Zaydān, Niẓām al-Qaḍā’ fī al-
Islām, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risālah, 1989), pp. 29-30. 
10 Wael B. Hallaq, Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), pp. 172-173.  
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After the schools (mażhabs) were well-established and the doctrine 
of taqlīd became prominent the practice of adjudication seems, as 
contemporary advocates of judicial constraint would say, merely to 
administer justice according to the rules of law. Hallaq clearly describes 
the function of judges, 
[t]he locus of legal and hermeneutical creativity was thus the 
mufti whereas qadi applied the law much as a bureaucrat applies 
administrative rules. The mufti worked with textual and doc-
trinal evidence–the stuff of hermeneutic–but the qadi applied 
ready made solutions, reached by the mufti, to particular cases, 
after having heard the evidence.11 
The Religious Courts’ Judges and the Procedural Unification 
Since the Dutch colonial era until the regime of New Order, 
Islamic courts were portrayed as having had suffered low prestige, 
unqualified judges and lack of well-established standard of 
adjudication. Describing the condition of the courts in that period, 
Daniel S Lev noticed that many people untrained, even in Islamic law 
it self, sitting as judges in Islamic courts. Consequently, Instead of 
being respected as religious leaders, the judges of Islamic courts were 
seen as merely as beambten (official) of the Dutch or local government. 
They were not well educated in Islamic law and were detached from 
religious authorities in the Muslim communities.12  
                                                                
11 Hallaq, Authority, Continuity and Change, p. 76. 
12 Daniel S. Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the Political Bases of Legal Institutions 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 11-13. Many Islamic organizations 
at that time had also noticed the same condition of the courts. This is not because of 
the lack of qualified ulama, but those ulama generally did not want to work under the 
Dutch Colonial administration. See Muhammad Hisyam, Caught between Three Fires: the 
Javanese Penghulu under the Dutch Colonial Administration 1882-1942 (Jakarta: INIS, 2001). 
In the post-revolutionary period, it was recognized that there were very few well-
trained judges and some even decided cases with the ignorance of the law. There were 
attempts and pressures to appoint well-educated judges, for instance through the 
recruitment from university graduates, but it was far from success. Daniel S Lev 
argued that the procedures of the courts were unsystematic. The cases before the 
courts were mostly maintained by judges’ common sense. Although there were 
improvements for example by the adoption to general courts’ system, it was very 
limited. Moreover, this was exacerbated by the absence of adequate supervision of 
Islamic trial courts by appeal courts. Even in the appeal courts, there were frequently 
judgments decided on procedural errors. Lev, Islamic Courts, p. 93, and pp. 128-31. 
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In the early 1980s, there was a policy of standardization of Islamic 
court judges introduced by the Department of Religious Affairs. It 
brought about significant changes in recruitment. The qualification of 
judges was one issue. With the policy of standardization Islamic court 
judges would hold a university degree and have knowledge of Islamic 
law as well as the national judicial system.13  
The promulgation of the Law on Religious Justice in 1989 
provided a robust basis for the improvement of the qualities of judges. 
This, in turn, would improve procedural standards of adjudication. 
This statute, however, should be read with a more general statute, 
namely the Law No 14 of 1970 on the Fundamental Provisions of 
Judicial Power. It will be obvious in the following paragraphs that Law 
of 1989 is maintained coherently with the Law of 1970. The 
amendment of Law of 1989 (Law No 3 of 2006 and Law No. 50 of 
2009) is also enacted by reference to the amendment of Law of 1970 
(as amended by Law No 4 of 2004 and Law No. 48 of 2009). 
In terms of the qualities of judges, the statute provides provisions 
such as the requirements of judges, procedures of appointment, 
removal and supervision. This statute considers a judge as ‘an officer 
who performs the duty of judicial power’ (Article 11(1)). To be 
appointed as the courts’ judge, one must meet some criteria. This 
includes a citizen of Indonesia, Muslim, devoted to God, loyal to 
Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945, civil servant and a degree in 
syari’ah or law knowledgeable of Islamic law (Article 13). The last two 
criteria were considered a significant change to the established 
requirements. As Cammack noted, ‘under the 1882 statute only the 
court chairman was civil servant, and prior law did not specify any 
educational qualifications for judges, the vast majority of whom did 
not have university degrees’.14 These qualifications are not subject to 
substantial changes when the legislature passed Law No 3/2006 on the 
amendment of Law No 7/1989. In 2009, with the promulgation of the 
second amandment of Religious Judiciary Law, two points were added 
to the prior qualificatons, namely succeeding the professional 
education for judges and aged 25-40 years old.  
                                                                
13 Mark Cammack, “Islamic Law in Indonesia’s New Order,” The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 38 (1989): pp. 69-70. 
14 Mark Cammack, “Indonesia’s 1989 Religious Judicature Act: Islamization of 
Indonesia or Indonesianization of Islam?”  Indonesia, vol. 63 (1997): p. 155 (citations 
omitted). 
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Before holding the position, a judge must take an oath. In Law of 
1989, the statements of oath consists of several pronouncements 
regarding the rejection of bribery and corruption, loyalty to Pancasila 
and the Constitution of 1945 and ethical conduct in dealing with cases 
before the court (Article 16). The amendment of this statute stipulates 
this in a simpler way. A judge is obliged to take an oath which is 
pronounced “[i]n the name of Allah, I swear that I will perform the 
judicial obligations for the best and justly, uphold the Constitution of 
1945, enforce all regulations compliantly in accordance with the 
Constitution of 1945 and loyal to the country and nation”. In both 
statues, judges, accordingly, are obliged to do justice not in accordance 
with Islamic law but with the Constitution and state laws.  
In addition, Law No 3/2006 places a great emphasis on the ‘one 
roof’ policy. According to Law No 7/1989, administrative supervision 
of Religious Court is under the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Now, all 
kinds of supervision are under the Supreme Court (Article 5). 
Regarding the appointment and removal of judges, now they are 
proposed by the head of Supreme Court with no reference to the 
Minister of Religious Affairs (Article 15). Meanwhile, in the previous 
law, Act of 1989 on religious court, such appointment and removal 
was performed by the President with proposal from the Minister of 
Religious Affairs and is based on the approval of the head of the 
Supreme Court,. All these changes restate the previous idea of judicial 
power as stipulated in Law No 4/2004.  
In addition to the improvement of the qualities of judges 
(supposedly influenced by the previously explained changes), Law of 
1989 also provides certain provisions concerning procedures. Chapter 
IV of the statute is devoted to the procedural law of the religious 
courts. This chapter was not subject for changes in Law of 2006. It 
consisted of three parts: general, trial on a dispute of marriage and 
costs. Interestingly, the chapter begins with the provision that 
‘Procedural Law applied in courts within Religious Justice is the Civil 
Procedural Law applied in courts within General Justice, except those 
which are specifically regulated in this Law’ (Article 54). In the General 
Part, except that the courts are obliged in every decision to start with 
the statement of bismillah, there is no provision that is distinct from 
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that of other courts according to Law No 14/970.15 By Law No 50 of 
2009, there are three provisions (60A-C) which are inserted between 
Article 60 and 61. Article 60A states that the judge must be 
accountable of her decisions in that she must give judicial reasonings 
for every decisions she made. Article 60B and C requires the state to 
provide legal aids for justice seekers. 
Concerning the court’s decisions, the statute requires that every 
decision must contain not only the reasons and the basis but also 
certain articles and provisions of relevant regulations or the unwritten 
source of law which constitutes the basis of adjudication (Article 
62(1)). This article provides the basic requirements of a decision. It 
demands that when deciding cases before the court, judges must take 
state regulations and/or unwritten law into consideration. The 
reference to statutory provisions in every judge’s decision becomes 
inevitable. While state laws in this statute are obvious, what the 
unwritten law here means remains unclear. It may be any or all of adat 
or Muslim local customs or unlegislated Islamic law.16  
The religious courts deliver decisions in a matter of a complaint 
(gugatan) against another Muslim in a dispute case and application 
(permohonan). In the elucidation of Article 60, the first type of decisions 
is called putusan (decision) and the second is penetapan (declaration). 
While the decision resolves the dispute and decides who wins the 
claim, the statement declares, for instance, the legality of a marriage 
performed before the promulgation of Marriage Law of 1974, the 
origins of a child (the elucidation of Article 49 (2)) and the validity of a 
talak divorce. From the courts’ decisions and statements one can ask 
for appeal to the Religious High Court (Pengadilan Tinggi Agama) 
(Article 61). And, if he or she wishes to challenge the High Court’s 
decisions, he or she could ask for cassation to the Supreme Court 
(Mahkamah Agung) (Article 63). 
With the promulgation of Law on Religious Justice it is likely that 
the procedures of the religious courts have been improved. Likely, The 
changes made are taken as efforts to achieve the standards applied in 
                                                                
15 Article 56 of Law of 1989 is comparable with Article 14 of Law of 1970, Article 57 
with Article 4, Article 58 with Article 5, Article 59 with Article 17, Article 60 with 
Article 18, Article 61 with Article 19 and Article 62 with Article 23. 
16 M.B. Hooker and Tim Lindsey, “Public Faces of Syari’ah in Contemporary 
Indonesia: Towards a National Mazhab?,” Australian Journal of Asian Law, vol. 4 (2002): 
p. 277. 
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other courts. Hence, judges at the religious courts, who have a 
university degree, must be qualified in applying those standards. The 
above discussion makes it clear that what are applied in the religious 
courts are procedural rules which, in some respects, might have 
nothing to do with Islamic procedural law. Moreover, the existing 
provisions do arguably put significant weight to the state laws 
concerning the courts’ activities in making decisions.   
The Substantive Laws of the Religious Courts  
Before Marriage Law No 1/1974 was enacted, there were no 
unified substantive laws applied in the religious courts. The courts 
relied much on Islamic legal scholarship maintained in the classical fiqh 
literatures. A demand for a codification of Islamic law actually 
appeared in the post-independence. However, because there was much 
opposition from the majority of Muslims, it did not succeed. The 
proposed codification was seen a radical change to the established 
religious doctrines.17 The courts remained in reliance on Islamic legal 
authorities particularly the Shafi’i author-jurists’ works. 18 In 18 
February 1958, the Bureau of Religious Justice in the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs delivered Surat Edaran No B/1/735 which instructed 
judges of the religious courts to seek guidance from 13 books of the 
Shafi‘i school in deciding cases.19 
Since the promulgation of Marriage Law in 2 January 1974, the 
courts have been provided with the statutory provisions ascertaining 
the application of Islamic law as defined by the state. The reference to 
classical sources of Islamic law is possible as long as it does not 
contradict those provisions. In order to complement the statute in 
providing the unified applicable laws for the courts, the Compilation 
of Islamic Law (Kompilasi Hukum Islam) is laid down by the Presidential 
Instruction No 1/1991. This paper will discuss two sources of law for 
the religious courts; Marriage Law and the Compilation.  
Marriage Law was enacted after bitter controversies on several 
provisions contained in the original bill. The statute to the large extent 
                                                                
17 See Lev, Islamic Courts, pp. 137-138. 
18 These books included, for instance, Mughnī al-Muḥtāj, al-Maḥallī, I‘ānah al-T {ālibīn, al-
Sharqāwī ‘alā al-Taḥrīr, al-Iqnā‘ and Fatḥ al-Qarīb. See, eg, the decisions of the religious 
courts in Notosusanto, Peradilan Agama Islam di Djawa dan Madura (Jogjakarta: n.p., 
1953), pp. 82-181. 
19 See the General Elucidation of the Compilation of Islamic Law point 3. 
  
Religious Court 
245 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 08, Number 02, December 2014 
adopts the established doctrines in Islamic law regarding marital affairs. 
As Katz and Katz noted, ‘this is the first time in Indonesia that 
substantive marriage law for Moslems has been codified by the state to 
any appreciable extent’.20 Through this new law, however, Islamic legal 
tradition of marriage was modified to accept “modern” interpretations 
of Islamic law. Moreover, it was forced to acknowledge the 
government’s role in interpreting the Islamic tradition.21  
Although the Islamic roots of the law are clear, one cannot deny 
the fact that this law was the result of a compromise among several 
elements of Indonesian society. More importantly it is the political 
product which provides the state definition of Islamic marriage law. 
The General Elucidation of Marriage Law indicates how the state 
ideology and legal politics constitute the foundations of the statute. It 
states that the statute accommodates the living legal traditions as well 
as the very principles embodied in Pancasila and the Constitution of 
1945. In addition, it highlights certain legal policies underlying the law 
including the necessity of the registration of marriage, the principle of 
monogamy and the principle of making divorce difficult. 
Marriage Law consists of 14 chapters and 67 articles. It lays down 
the provisions regarding foundations of marriage, its prerequisites and 
prevention, marriage contract, rights and responsibilities of husband 
and wife, marital property, dissolution of marriage, position of 
children, rights and responsibilities between parents and children, 
guardianship, parentage of children and marriage outside Indonesia.  
In 1991, the government promulgated a new regulation concerning 
rules of law applicable in the religious courts. The Presidential 
Instruction No 1 of 1991 gave an order to the Minister of Religious 
Affairs to spread and apply the so-called Compilation of Islamic Law. 
The Minister then followed up this instruction with a decree (KMA) 
No 154 of 1991.22 The Compilation is, in fact, an Islamic Code for 
                                                                
20 June S Katz and Ronald S Katz, “The New Indonesian Marriage Law: A Mirror of 
Indonesia’s Political, Cultural and Legal Systems,” The American Journal of Comparative 
Law, vol. 23 (1975): pp. 669-670. 
21 Mark Cammack, Lawrence A Young and Tim Heaton, “Legislating Social Change in 
an Islamic Society: Indonesia’s Marriage Law,” The American Journal of Comparative Law, 
vol. 44 (1996): p. 46. 
22 On the historical account of the Compilation, see, eg, Departemen Agama RI, 
Instruksi Presiden RI Nomor 1 Tahun 1991 Kompilasi Hukum Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: 
Direktorat Pembinaan Badan Peradilan Agama, 1998/1999), pp. 121-178; Ahmad 
Imam Mawardi, “The Political Backdrop of the Enactment of the Compilation of 
  
 
Ahmad Rofii 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 08, Number 02, December 2014 
246 
Indonesian Muslims; a code in which the idea behind it is arguably 
back to the Code of Majallah which governed most of the Muslim 
countries in the early of twentieth century.23 The Compilation becomes 
a legitimate source, though remains contested among constitutional 
theorists as well as judges of the Religious Courts,24 for the religious 
courts which provides certainty and uniformity in the application of 
Islamic law in Indonesia.25 As mentioned in the General Elucidation, 
the Compilation is made in order to provide a guidance of applicable 
laws for judges within the jurisdiction of the Religious Courts. 
It might be suggested that the motive behind the introduction of 
the Compilation is religious because it would provide the religious 
courts with certain Islamic rules adopted from Islamic legal authorities. 
However, it seems that the political background and reasons dominate 
the law making. Yahya Harahap, one of the committee members of the 
Compilation, pointed out that there were at least four objectives 
operative in the law making process.26 First, by providing the source of 
reference or substantive law, it was seen a necessary pillar for religious 
justice. Second, it was aimed at promoting legal unification and 
certainty. Third, it was meant to strengthen ukhuwwah (brotherhood 
among Muslims) and also to diminish conflicts among Muslims 
(khila>fiyyah). Finally, it was aimed at encouraging disputes settlement in 
formal institutions. It is clear, then, that the very objective of the 
                                                                                                                                      
Islamic Laws in Indonesia,” in Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra (eds), Shari’a and 
Politics in Modern Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), pp. 127-131; Euis Nurlaelawati, 
Modernization, Tradition and Identity: the Kompilasi Hukum Islam and Legal Practice in the 
Indonesian Religious Courts (Leiden: EJ Brill, 2010), pp. 80-89. 
23 On the Majalla, see Norman Anderson, Law Reform in the Muslim World (London: 
University of London Athlone Press, 1976), pp. 51-52. 
24 On the contested authority of the KHI, see Amrullah Ahmad, et.al., Dimensi Hukum 
Islam dalam Sistem Hukum Nasional (Jakarta: GIP, 1996); Euis Nurlaelawati, 
Modernization, Tradition and Identity, Ch. III. Challenging the KHI’s patriarchal 
standpoints, Government sponsored Team of Gender Mainstreaming produced what 
is called “the Counter Legal Draft of the KHI”. However, after heated protests, the 
Government finally stepped down from continuing the project. See Marzuki Wahid, 
“Counter Legal Draft Kompilasi Hukum Islam (CLD-KHI) dalam Perspektif Politik 
Hukum di Indonesia” Paper presented at The 4th Annual Islamic Studies Postgraduate 
Conference, The University of Melbourne, 17-18 November 2008, pp. 48-68; 
Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity, pp. 125-129. 
25 Cammack, “Indonesia’s 1989 Religious Judicature Act”, p. 165.  
26 See Mawardi, “The Political Backdrop”, p. 137. 
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Compilation relates to the idea of providing the religious courts with 
substantive laws and, accordingly, establishing the legal unification and 
certainty in the country. 
The Compilation consists of three books, marriage (Article 1-170), 
inheritance (Article 171-214) and wakaf (Article 215-229). In many 
places, state legislations and regulations are quoted as the legitimate 
source of reference. The Compilation reveals the character of the 
modern codifications. The codification is a salient feature of the 
modern state sovereignty which is established on the idea of a 
monopoly of law making authority.27 It symbolizes the state power in 
defining Islamic law. Islamic law is recognized to the point that it will 
not conflict with the national ideology and legal policies. Moreover, the 
nature of the Compilation itself indicates blatantly how the state 
control becomes possible particularly in the area of personal status. It 
might be true to name the Compilation merely as ‘a bureaucratic 
handbook’, as Hooker and Lindsey noted.28 This is because the notion 
of the application of Islamic law in the Compilation is subject to 
bureaucratic procedures. Its formulation, which is very simple 
statements and in accordance with the form of standard legislations, 
seems to make the courts greatly rely on it.  
As mentioned above, Law on Religious Justice requires the 
religious courts’ judges to greatly consider relevant statutory provisions 
and regulations in decision making. The discussion in this section also 
demonstrates that Marriage Law and the Compilation constitute 
substantive laws of the courts. The discussion suggests that the court 
judges will consider these regulations when dealing with cases before 
them. In what follows, this paper will examine the religious courts’ 
decisions on inheritance. It attempts to answer the question of whether 
the courts’ decisions greatly rely on Islamic sources – by using Islamic 
legal reasoning – or state regulations. 
The Religious Courts’ Decisions and Legal Reasoning: The Case 
of Inheritance  
Inheritance law in Indonesia was linked to the struggles between 
religious and Indonesian identity, or the conflicts between the 
advocates of Shari’a implementation and the supporters of adat law. 
                                                                
27 See, e.g., Cammack, Lawrence A. Young and Tim Heaton, “Legislating Social 
Change”, p. 53; Hallaq, “Juristic Authority vs State Power”, p. 255. 
28 Hooker and Tim Lindsey, “Public Faces of Syari’ah”, p. 278. 
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Devoted Muslims would encourage the application of Islamic rules of 
inheritance (farā’id}), while adat supporters encouraged the reference to 
local custom as a form of the adherence to indigenous identity.29 This 
struggle was particularly reflected in the religious courts’ jurisdiction 
over inheritance. The courts’ achievement to be legitimate in deciding 
inheritance cases was considered ideological. As Daniel S Lev pointed 
out, “the inheritance competence was regarded as ground won for 
Islam, in a critical historical social and political sense rather than 
merely a narrowly legal one.”30 
From 1937 to 1989 inheritance had been no longer a jurisdiction 
of the religious courts in Java and Madura. Outside these islands, the 
courts continued to enjoy such jurisdiction. Although formally 
incompetent to decide inheritance cases, still, the courts in Java and 
Madura continued to do so. Inheritance problems on a large scale were 
brought to the courts. Judges after considering the problems and 
relevant Islamic doctrines gave legal opinions or fatwas. The format of 
fatwa seems to be the same as that of the courts’ decision.31 With the 
enactment of Law on Religious justice, inheritance is included as one 
of the jurisdictions of all religious courts in the country. The courts 
now can resolve inheritance problems in a formal manner.  
Before analyzing the courts’ decisions on inheritance, we need to 
make clear the nature of the courts’ decisions. The structure of 
decisions has not been the subject of significant changes since the 
Dutch period. The same format would also be found in general courts’ 
decisions.32 Law on Religious Justice adds only a provision that the 
decision must be commenced with Bismillah. The decisions mainly 
contain the identity of plaintiffs and respondents or appellants and 
respondents, the issue of a case at hand (duduk perkara), legal 
considerations (menimbang or tentang hukumnya) and a decision (memutus 
or mengadili). The identity of parties before the court includes their age, 
religion, professional work and address. The issue of a case consists of 
                                                                
29 Mark Cammack, “Islamic Inheritance in Indonesia: The Influence of Hazairin’s 
Theory of Bilateral Inheritance” Australian Journal of Asian Law, vol. 4 (2002): p. 295.  
30 Lev, Islamic Courts, p. 198. 
31 Ibid., pp. 199-204. 
32 For Java and Madura it refers to HIR (Herziene Inlandsch Reglement) Article 184 and 
RBg (Rechtsreglement Voor de Bintengewesten) Article 195 for outside Java and Madura. See, 
e.g., Riduan Syahrani, Himpunan Peraturan Hukum Acara Perdata Indonesia (Bandung: 
Alumni, 1991), p. 216, and p. 266. 
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material facts, the plaintiff and defendant’s arguments and, if the 
appellate court is concerned, the trial court’s decision. Legal conside-
rations generally include legal standing of the parties, the court’s view 
of the material facts, its evaluation of the plaintiff and defendant’s 
arguments and a reference to relevant regulations and/or Islamic 
literatures. Simple statements regarding the result of the case and costs 
of proceedings are also mentioned in this consideration. Finally, the 
result of a case is stated completely and clearly in the decision of the 
court.  
The religious courts’ decisions that will be discussed are the 
decisions on inheritance issued since the promulgation of Law on 
Religious Justice and the Compilation of Islamic Law. The decisions at 
hand generally deal with the determination of heirs, their legitimate 
portion, the joint marital property, the portion of adopted children and 
the status of a gift and a bequest. To find the courts’ reasoning, the 
emphasis will be placed on the courts’ legal considerations. The term 
“menimbang” (in consideration of) arguably shows the grounds of their 
decisions. As is also the case with the general courts, the first part of 
consideration deals with ascertaining the material facts and legal 
standing of both the plaintiff and defendant. The courts are, then, 
concerned with the evaluation of the parties’ arguments and their own 
arguments and justification.  
Considerations regarding relevant statutory provisions and 
regulations are determinative of the courts’ decisions. It seems that the 
courts’ reasoning is merely to apply those regulations in given facts. 
The courts’ arguments are mainly about whether a claim is in 
accordance or conflict with relevant regulations. This approach is of 
the apparent characteristics of judicial reasoning in the Civil Law 
system. As Marryman has noted, 
[t]he judge becomes a kind of expert clerk. He is presented 
with a fact situation to which a ready legislative response will 
be readily found in all except the extraordinary case. His 
function is merely to find the right legislative provision, couple 
it with the fact situation and bless the solution that is more or 
less automatically produced from the union. The whole process 
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of judicial decision is made to fit into the formal syllogism of 
scholastic logic.33 
I will provide three cases on the issue of inheritance that were 
adjudicated before the religious courts in various regions of the 
country. The courts’ decisions on these cases reveal how they reason, 
deal with the law (legislations/regulations) and maintain Islamic 
sources.  
In H M Harun bin H M Soleh and others v Nurmalawati binti H M Ali, 
the plaintiffs sued the defendant on the ground that the defendant had 
illegitimately controlled the deceased’s (Hj Mariyam binti H M Soleh) 
property. They argued that the defendant was not one of the 
deceased’s heirs because she was an adopted child. The defendant in 
response argued that the property she currently controlled was a gift 
(hibah) from the deceased before she died. The plaintiffs challenged the 
validity of the gift because it was not in accordance with inheritance 
law in Islam (farā’id}). The Religious Court of Palembang held that the 
plaintiffs’ claims were not supported by evidence. As the gift was 
registered as the gift act (akta hibah) almost a year before the deceased 
died, the gift accordingly was a pure gift in accordance with Article 212 
of the Compilation. This was also supported by the yurisprudensi of the 
Supreme Court.34 The plaintiffs then appealed to the Religious High 
Court of Palembang.35 As the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, 
they appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court allowed the appeal on 
the grounds that the accepted gift should not exceed one-third of the 
inherited property. The Court’s decisions are based mainly on whether 
the previous courts had correctly applied and interpreted relevant law. 
Because the provisions in the Compilation (Article 210) were not 
properly applied, the Court decided to set aside the previous courts’ 
decision.36 
In the aforementioned case, the courts relied on the Compilation, 
although they interpreted it in different ways. The reference to Islamic 
sources was totally absent. The value of a gift in Islamic law is 
                                                                
33 John Henry Marryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of 
Western Europe and Latin America, 2nd ed (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1985), p. 36. 
34 Putusan Pengadilan Agama Palembang No. 357/pdt.G/1996/PA.Plg. 
35 Putusan Pengadilan Tinggi Agama Palembang No. 13/Pdt.G/1997/PTA.Plg. 
36 Putusan Mahkamah Agung No. 29/K/AG/1998. 
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enshrined by many prophetic traditions (hadīth). Once a property is 
transferred as a gift to someone, it becomes under his or her 
possession. Regarding the total amount of the property allowed to be 
given as a gift, the majority of ‘ulamā agree that one can donate all his 
property during his or her life. However, according to Muhammad ibn 
H {asan and other followers of the Hanafi School, someone who gives 
her whole property is mentally weak and for that reason her conducts 
to property must be interdicted.37 The courts’ decisions clearly ignored 
these sources of reasoning. The courts considered only whether Article 
212 of the Compilation, which stipulates that a gift cannot be annulled 
except a gift from a parent to their children, or Article 210, which 
limits the gift to one-third of the property, could be applied in this 
case.  Similarly, there are many other cases decided by the religious 
courts solely on the basis of the legislations, in particular the 
Compilation.  
In other cases, however, the religious courts refer to and cite 
Islamic sources. In Sapari bin Sartawi alias Tawi v Sapari alias Suwarno bin 
Darjan and another, the plaintiff sued the defendants on the grounds that 
because the plaintiff was the only child and heir of the deceased, he 
should share all the deceased’s property. The plaintiff claimed that the 
defendants had controlled illegitimately the deceased’s property. In 
their arguments the defendants rejected sharing the property because 
the plaintiff was not the deceased’s child. They argued that the 
deceased only had a wife, Sarmi, and never had the second wife who 
was allegedly the plaintiff’s mother. The Religious Court of Kisaran 
held that on the basis of agreed evidence the court recognized that the 
plaintiff was the deceased’s child. In dealing with evidence, the court 
referred to many provisions including the RBg of Article 308(1) and 
309 which governed the value of witness and Article 180 which 
governed observation on a given object of disputes and Law No 
5/1960. In the light of Article 174(1) of the Compilation, the court 
then decided that the plaintiff was the deceased’s heir. And, because he 
was the only heir of the deceased, the plaintiff took all the deceased’s 
property (‘as }ābah bi nafsih). To support this conclusion, the court 
                                                                
37 See, e.g., Sayyid Sābiq, Fiqh al-Sunnah, 4th ed. (Beirut: Dār al- Fikr, 1983), vol. 3, p. 
392; Wahbah al-Zuḥailī, Mawsū‘ah al-Fiqh al-Islāmī wa al-Qaḍāyā al-Mu‘aṣirah (Damascus: 
Dār al-Fikr, 2012), vol. 4, pp. 697-699. 
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referred to the authority of ijmā’ as mentioned in Ibn Rusyd’s book, 
Bidāyah al-Mujtahid.38 
The defendants appealed to the Religious High Court of Medan. 
The court affirmed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the appeal. 
In its considerations, this appellate court rejected the grounds of the 
defendants’ (here the appellants’) arguments and proposed evidence by 
reference to Law on Religious Justice and yurisprudensi. The appellants’ 
objection to the existence of the deceased’s marriage with the 
plaintiff’s (here the defendant’s) mother was regarded ill-founded. This 
was because, among other things, the statutes and regulations 
concerning marriage were not retrospective. To prove the existence of 
marriage and a child, the court only needed the available evidence as 
stipulated in the Shafi‘i book, I‘ānah al-t}ālibīn.39 The appellant then 
appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court allowed the appeal. The 
Court’s considerations are about misinterpretation and misapplication 
of the relevant statutes and regulations.40  
The above-mentioned case was an action for a legitimate division 
of inheritance property. To decide whether the plaintiff could be 
allocated the assigned shares, the court initially held that the plaintiff 
was actually the deceased’s child. Having acknowledged that the 
plaintiff was the only heir of the deceased, the court then decided that 
he would own all the deceased’s property. The court’s decision here 
raised two legal issues, namely the evidences of the origins of a child 
and his allocated portion. Regarding the first, the trial court relied on 
the RBg while the High Court referred to the authority of the Shafi‘i 
school. This reference by the High Court is made on the basis of the 
principle of non-retroactivity of the relevant regulations. In this sense, 
the court’s consideration actually demonstrates how the court would 
be bound by these regulations prospectively. The issue of evidence is 
also a subject matter in Islamic legal literatures. In general, there are 
many kinds of evidence in Islamic fiqh: testimony, confession, oath, 
qasāmah and circumstantial evidence (qarā’in). Muslim jurists have 
different opinions regarding the value of them.41 As for the claim for a 
                                                                
38 Putusan Pengadilan Agama Kisaran No. 147/Pdt.G/1994/PA-Kis. 
39 Putusan Pengadilan Tinggi Agama Medan No. 34/Pdt.G/1995/PTA-Mdn. 
40 Putusan Mahkamah Agung No. 216 K/AG/1996. 
41 See ‘Abd al-Karīm Zaydān, Niẓām al-Qaḍā’, pp. 155-242; Wahbah al-Zuḥailī, 
Mawsū‘ah al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, vol. 6, pp. 474-557. 
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right of inheritance, it is necessary to prove that the plaintiff has the 
blood relationship (nasab) with the deceased. In doing so, the court 
relies on the availability of the above mentioned evidence provided to 
the court. The second issue was dealt by the trial court on the basis of 
the Compilation (Article 174) and the consensus (ijmā‘). Apart from a 
daughter, a son is a residuary heir in his own right (‘as }abah bi nafsih). He 
could inherit all the deceased’s property when he stands alone. This is 
clear from the court’s reference to the consensus. Islamic legal theory 
places the authority of consensus after the Qur’an and Sunna.  
In this case, the court’s decision underlines the close correspon-
dence between the legislations and the Islamic sources. Many decisions 
held by the religious courts in Indonesia take this model of reasoning. 
It seems not enough for the courts to refer only to the legislations. For 
the courts, the authority of the decisions would be strengthened by 
their reference to the Islamic sources. The reliance on the legislations 
as well as the Islamic sources indicates the twin character of the courts. 
They are part of the state organs which has to apply the state law. At 
the same time, the courts are Islamic institutions which are obliged to 
enforce Islamic law. Therefore, for the courts the reference to Islamic 
sources becomes more persuasive.  
In the third case, Madli bin Aswan and others v Hj Khoiriyah, the 
religious court also took into consideration Islamic sources as well as 
legislations. In this case, the plaintiffs claimed that they shared the 
deceased’s property which was under the control of the defendant. 
They asked the court to include them as the deceased’s heirs and 
allocated each of them the assigned shares. Because it was a joint 
property between the deceased and the defendant, they claimed one-
half of the property. In addition, because the defendant had controlled 
all the joint property, accordingly she had acted against the law. The 
defendant contended that the action should be dismissed because there 
were many heirs who were not included in the plaintiffs’ complaint, 
such as representative heirs (ahli waris pengganti) and an adopted child. 
Moreover, the alleged property in fact had been sold for medical 
maintenance of the deceased.  
The Religious Court of Pemalang held that the plaintiffs were 
entitled to legitimate portions of the property. The court argued that 
the problem of representative heirs was based on personal reasoning 
(ijtihād). There was no consensus among Muslim scholars on this issue. 
It is important to consider the court’s reasons for not acknowledging 
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the existence of the representative heirs. Having stated that local 
custom as well as local ulama did not recognize them, the court pointed 
out that ‘if this case was maintained in accordance with this opinion, 
public benefits (kemashlahatan umat) and legal certainty would be 
achieved’. The court interpreted Article 185 of the Compilation, which 
explicitly recognized the existence of substitute heirs, as not pointing 
to the mandatory status of these heirs’ shares. In addition, the court 
considered that the adopted child according to the Compilation was 
not an issue of inheritance but of bequest. Having accepted the 
plaintiffs’ complaint, the court decided that all the property in dispute 
was jointly owned and should be divided accordingly. The Qur’an an-
Nisa 12 and 176 were quoted to highlight each share.42 Having not 
been satisfied with the result, the defendant appealed to the Religious 
High Court of Central Java (Semarang). The High Court decided to 
allow the appeal. According to the court, the petitum proposed by the 
plaintiffs was not valid. The complaint was also held unclear or 
obscures (obscuur libel). Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claim could not be 
accepted.43 
The High Court’s reasoning in the above case seems to be too 
procedural, judging the complaint merely on the basis of its fulfillment 
to the required procedures and administration. The grounds of the 
court’s decision are legal concepts unknown in Islamic law. The trial 
court interestingly appealed to the notion of local benefits and public 
interests (mas }lah}ah) to annul the portion of representative heirs. In 
doing so, the court interpreted the provisions of the Compilation in a 
different way. Regarding the adopted child, the court referred only to 
the Compilation. This very fact demonstrates the significance of the 
Compilation in the judgment. It seems that the Compilation will always 
be considered even when the court gives unprecedented judgment. 
The appeal to the idea of public benefits and legal certainty aims to set 
a ground for the court to take another version of interpretation which 
deems the allocation of shares to the representative heirs as not 
compulsory. In fact, traditional Islamic law does not recognize the 
concept of representative heirs. Neither divine texts (nas }) nor ulama’s 
opinions support it. This is a new formulation (ijtihād) introduced by 
Hazairin which is currently acknowledged by the state. As is also the 
                                                                
42 Putusan Pengadilan Agama Pemalang No. 1470/Pdt.G/1996/PA.Pml 
43 Putusan Pengadilan Tinggi Agama Semarang No. 70/Pdt.G/1997/PTA.Smg 
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case with every ijtihād, the value of representative heirs is not absolute. 
Public benefits might provide a sound ground for admitting or 
rejecting this concept. The court’s reference to this notion is 
unfortunately not elaborate. There is no further explanation, for 
instance, of why this authority is taken into consideration and how it 
should be preferred to other authorities.  
The Practice of Islamic Legal Reasoning 
The above-mentioned case examples inform the readers about the 
practice of judicial reasoning in the religious courts particularly since 
the promulgation of the Compilation. It seems that the reasoning 
employed is generally legalistic. The task of the courts is merely to 
apply the law in given cases. Emphasis is much given to procedural 
matters. From those cases, however, we have three different models or 
approaches of judicial reasoning employed by the religious courts. 
First, many religious courts’ decisions provide only the legislations 
particularly the Compilation as the sole source of reasoning. The 
legislations are to be found by the judges and then applied in a given 
case. The process of reasoning follows formal syllogism or deductive 
logics. Hooker and Lindsey have demonstrated the courts’ dependence 
on state laws without much elaboration and the way the courts come 
to judgments. They pointed out,  
[t]he reported yurisprudensi is sparse and when available 
minimalist, in the sense that, in most cases, decisions are given 
in a bare form–sometimes only one or two pages–with little 
concern expressed to explain the reasoning. The only constant 
feature of Religious Court decisions is the use of Pancasila and, 
to a lesser extent, the Kompilasi, as basic reference points but 
these tell us almost nothing about legal reasoning.44 
Secondly, the courts employ and refer to the Islamic sources in 
combination with the legislations. Still, it shows same implications.. 
The use of the Islamic sources is complementary. As indicated above, 
this dual reference might suggest the courts’ needs to legitimize their 
decisions on the basis of the state law as well as Islamic law. However, 
in using the Islamic sources, they remain faithful to deductive logics; 
they maintain these sources as in upholding legislations. 
                                                                
44 Hooker and Tim Lindsey, “Public Faces of Syari’ah”, p. 276. 
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Those two approaches employed by the religious courts reveal the 
character of judicial reasoning embedded in the courts. It has been 
argued that since the medieval Islam, the judges (qād}i’s) were no longer 
mujtahids. They should be affiliated to one school (madhhab) recognized 
by the rulers and Muslim community. In addition, there was a 
widespread belief in Muslim community that the task of the judges was 
merely to apply the law as bureaucrats applied the administrative law 
on the basis of the established school and legal opinions of muftis.45 In 
Islamic point of view, what these judges usually do is to practice taqlīd, 
meaning to adhere to the well-established doctrines of Islamic law 
without much consideration of the basis (us }ūl) and evidences (adillah) 
out of which legal rules are derived.  
Another explanation might come from the fact that since the 
establishment of modern nation-state the authority of law making has 
been taken up by the state. It alone is sovereign in making law. The 
state examines this authority by making codifications. The professional 
lawyers provide with their methods of interpretation, how these 
codifications are to be applied in given situations. The Indonesian legal 
system reflects this fact. Inherited from the Dutch legal tradition, 
Indonesian courts are obliged to apply the law according to legitimate 
methods of judicial reasoning. The religious courts accordingly should 
decide cases before the court on the basis of existing laws provided by 
the state and judicial methods which are commonly and legitimately 
used in all courts. The role of judges is to find a true meaning of law, 
statute. Courts are bound by a code, statute. Legislative acts, therefore, 
constitute the very source of judicial reasoning in the Civil Law 
world.46 As Pierre Legrand argues, all judicial decisions must adhere to 
the “law of the text”; “this text is experienced as sacred”.47 
Using the Islamic terminology, the judges are muqallids (people who 
perform taqlīd), not to the school doctrines but to the state-defined 
law. As Netherlands and then Indonesia belong to Civil Law system, 
the judges’ function as indicated by Merryman is merely to find the 
right provisions by using syllogistic methods. 
                                                                
45 Hallaq, Authority, Continuity and Change, p. 76. 
46 René David and John E. C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An 
Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law, 3rd ed. (London: Stevens, 1985), pp. 134-137. 
47 Pierre Legrand, “Review: Antiqui Juris Civilis Fabulas,” The University of Toronto Law 
Journal, vol. 45 (1995): p. 311. 
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In the final approach, the courts may apply Islamic legal reasoning 
with the emphasis on the objectives of Islamic law (maqās }id al-sharī‘a).48 
The trial court’s reasoning in the last case (Madli bin Aswan and others v 
Hj Khoiriyah) is indicative of the controversial nature of the 
Compilation in the beginning of its promulgation. For some ulama, the 
norms contained in this “quasi-law” are unacceptable according to the 
conventional jurisprudence.  In considering the Compilation, the court 
tried to position it in the framework of Islamic legal theory (us }ūl al-
fiqh). It exploited the key concept in the realm of the objectives of 
Shari’a, namely mas }lah}at, in its interpretation of the norm of 
representative heirs. Here, Islamic legal reasoning might be employed 
but in very brief and straightforward.  
In his analysis of the Religious Court of Tasikmalaya on the case of 
Warsih & Warnah v. Iim Rohimah, John R. Bowen demonstrated the 
court’s appeal to Islamic legal reasoning. He suggested that in that case 
the Court made reference to al-Qur’an 4:176 in support of its 
argument on the rights of heirs and, then, provided Islamic basis of the 
gift rulings in the Compilation. However, the basis of which the 
limitation of gifts rests is mainly on Islamic authority of bequests not 
gifts. Bowen then argued that “the reasoning process involves an 
analogy, a form of qiyās, even though the term ‘qiyās’ is never used, nor 
an explicit analogy ever drawn.”49 Here, the Court might apply qiyās, 
but in indirect fashion and, consequently, without conforming its 
requirements. In justifying the Compilation rule on that matter, the 
Court also argued on the basis of maqās }id that “limiting gifts preserves 
the welfare of the heirs and benefits society by reducing begging”.50 
Although the reference to a method in Islamic legal reasoning is made, 
                                                                
48 The concept of Maqās }id al-Sharī‘a has been developed since centuries ago as part of 
Islamic legal theories. Its discussion is placed under the subject al-mas }lahat al-mursalah 
(the unrestricted interest). In the modern context, however, it becomes a new 
discipline representing the methodology and philosophy of Islamic law. See Jasser 
Auda, Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach (London & 
Washington: IIIT, 2007). In this paper, I use maqās }id as a methodology of Islamic legal 
reasoning which includes methods of qiyās, istiḥsān, istiṣlāḥ and others. See, e.g., Satria 
Effendi M. Zein, Ushul Fiqh (Jakarta: Kencana, 2008), pp. 233-238.     
49 John R. Bowen, Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia: an Anthropology of Public Reasoning 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 137 (emphasis is mine).  
50 John R. Bowen, Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia, pp. 139-140. 
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the decision suffers from the clear-cut fashion of reasoning for its lack 
of reference to and analysis on Islamic sources regarding gifts.    
Satria Effendi has clearly demonstrated how the courts’ decisions 
are far from being satisfactory in terms of the Islamic legal point of 
view. In his analysis on different decisions made by the Religious 
Court of Mataram and the Supreme Court regarding the division of 
inheritance property and determination of legitimate heirs, Effendi 
examined that the decisions of both the Religious Court and the 
Supreme Court have made reference to the different views in Islamic 
legal scholarship; the Religious Court indirectly refer to the view of the 
majority of jurist, but the Supreme Court relied on the opinion of Ibn 
‘Abbas on the matter. However, they failed to provide reasons why 
they chose one view and discounted the other.51 What they did is 
merely to cite those views. They ignored the basis on which these 
views were formulated. This straightforward and simple reasoning is 
also evident in the Supreme Court’s decision on the share allocated to 
the deceased’s widow who was non-Muslim.52 Although the widow 
was not regarded as the deceased’s heir, the Court concluded that a 
certain part of the property should be assigned to her as was }iyyah 
wājibah (mandatory bequest). The Court’s standpoint was based mainly 
by the Previous Court’s relevant decision (Yurisprudensi) and quoting 
the authority of Yūsuf al-Qarad}āwī. Here, no elaborative arguments, by 
employing Islamic legal reasoning, were given as to why the Court took 
that position. 
Conclusion 
There are likely many similarities between religious and civil courts. 
With regard to procedural rules the religious courts rely on the general 
court procedures. Accordingly, there is no significant difference bet-
ween them in the proceedings, grounds of judicial reasoning and the 
structure of decisions. The applicable substantive laws in the religious 
courts are mainly Marriage Law, the Compilation of Islamic Law and 
unwritten laws, which might be read as adat and unwritten Islamic law. 
Although both Marriage Law and the Compilation are mostly derived 
                                                                
51 Satria Effendi M. Zein, Problematika Hukum Keluarga Islam Kontemporer: Analisis 
Yurisprudensi dengan Pendekatan Ushuliyah, (Jakarta: Kencana, 2004), pp. 293-306. 
52 Putusan Mahkamah Agung No. 16 K/AG/2010. Assigning washiyyah wâjibah to non-
Muslim relatives constitutes the Supreme Court’s precedent (No. 368 K/AG/1995 
and No. 51 K/AG/1999).  
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from Islamic law, some provisions indicate a significant departure from 
the traditional interpretation. In addition, as codifications these regu-
lations greatly reflect the state policies. The notion of Islamic law as 
the courts’ substantive law has turned out to be the state-defined law.  
The structure of the courts’ decisions is not something unique. 
The very concept underlying the judicial decision making in the courts 
is likely to be found in most Civil Law courts; judges are merely to 
apply the regulations in given cases by using the syllogistic method of 
reasoning. 
I have argued that the judges of the religious courts generally 
applied state laws using judicial methods which are common with 
other Indonesian courts. So, it can be concluded that there is no 
significance reference to Islamic law other than the stipulated and 
codified in the state laws such as the compilation. Even if there is a 
reference to the classical Islamic law, the court position it merely as a 
support to their decision. Moreover, the application are very simple 
and straightforward fashion.[] 
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